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The major beneﬁt of exchange rate ﬂexibility is to facilitate international relative price
adjustment in response to country-speciﬁc real shocks in the presence of nominal rigidities
(Friedman, 1953). The existing theory argues that the beneﬁt is increasing in the degree
of trade openness measured by the trade-to-GDP ratio (Frenkel and Aizenman, 1982;
Sutherland, 2006; Kollmann, 2004). This is because a high degree of openness implies
that the reallocation of factors of production takes place mostly within the traded-goods
sector, not between the traded- and nontraded-goods sectors. Hence, a high degree of
openness does not require large adjustments of the internal relative price or the price of
nontraded goods relative to traded goods. However, the recent work by Adrian and Gros
(2004) argue that the beneﬁt is not monotonically increasing in the degree of openness,
because openness increases vulnerability to potentially large external shocks.
This paper contributes to the debate by showing that the beneﬁt of exchange rate ﬂex-
ibility is not monotonic in the degree of trade openness, when exchange rate ﬂuctuations
inﬂuence the specialization pattern. We evaluate the beneﬁt using the stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium (SDGE) model with endogenous specialization and wage rigidities in
Naknoi (2008).1 To simplify the model, trade is assumed to be driven by comparative
advantage, as in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), instead of monopolistic com-
petition, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). In the short run, changes in the relative wage
cause exporters to switch in and out of exporting and consequently generate endogenous
ﬂuctuations in the composition of trade. We refer to such ﬂuctuations as adjustments
along the extensive margin. These ﬂuctuations are absent in standard macro models
studying adjustments of prices and quantities, or the so-called intensive margin.
This modeling approach is motivated by the evidence for entries and exits among
exporters in Besedes and Prusa (2006). Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Naknoi (2008) use
1See Bergin and Corsetti (2008) for recent work on the impact of monetary policy on adjustments
along the extensive margin of production in a closed-economy setup.
2this approach to explain dynamics of the real exchange rate (RER). Although this study
uses the same model as Naknoi (2008), it focuses on diﬀerent variables and answers an
entirely diﬀerent question. To be precise, we compare the welfare across exchange rate
regimes to ﬁnd a relationship between the beneﬁt of exchange rate ﬂexibility and the
degree of trade openness.
Exchange rate regimes are characterized by the interest rate rules. To ﬁx the exchange
rate, the home central bank follows the exchange rate targeting rule similar to Benigno
(2004) and Monacelli (2004). When the home central bank ﬂoats its exchange rate, it
follows the feedback rule adopted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Naknoi
(2008), who found that the feedback rule can replicate the RER dynamics quite well.
The foreign central bank follows the same feedback rule regardless of the exchange rate
regime. The measure for welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rates is the permanent decrease
in consumption that yields the same expected utility as the ﬂexible exchange rate regime,
similar to the measures in Sutherland (2006), Devereux and Engel (2003) and Kollmann
(2004).
The key mechanism is that a rise in the relative wage, which is increasing in exchange
rate appreciation, causes some ﬁrms to quit exporting. These ﬁrms have lower productiv-
ity than other exporters but higher productivity than other nontraded-goods producers,
thus they raise the average productivity in both sectors, and more so in the nontraded
sector. Hence, endogenous productivity ﬂuctuations following adjustments along the ex-
tensive margin oﬀset movements in the relative wage and reduce volatility of the terms of
trade. For this reason, adjustments along the extensive margin have a stabilization eﬀect.
In the quantitative part of the paper, we calibrate the model with country-speciﬁc
shocks on total factor productivity (TFP). We ﬁnd that when the two countries have
symmetric size, the ﬂexible exchange rate regime yields higher welfare, despite the fact
that the interest rule under the ﬂexible regime is not an optimal rule. Thus, an optimal
rule would further raise the beneﬁt from ﬂoating exchange rates and would not change
3the cross-regime welfare ranking. The result is also consistent with Devereux and Engel
(2003) given that ﬁrms practice producer currency pricing.
To quantify the stabilization eﬀect of adjustments along the extensive margin, we
decompose the beneﬁt of exchange rate ﬂexibility into the beneﬁt along the extensive
margin and the beneﬁt along the intensive margin. Speciﬁcally, the beneﬁt along the
intensive margin is the welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rate in the model with exogenous
specialization given by the steady state trade pattern in the benchmark model. We
measure the beneﬁt along the extensive margin as the diﬀerence between the welfare
loss in the benchmark model and that in the model with exogenous specialization. The
predicted beneﬁt along the extensive margin in the home country is as large as 1 percent
of consumption, and equivalent to three times of the beneﬁt along the intensive margin.
Next, we vary the country size and the trade costs parameters to study the eﬀects
of openness on the welfare comparison. There are three ﬁndings. First, the degree of
openness is decreasing in country size and trade costs. When we decompose the degree
of openness into the extensive and intensive margins, we ﬁnd that the extensive margin
of openness is increasing in country size, but decreasing in trade costs. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the evidence in Hummels and Klenow (2005). In our model, the large
country exports a wide range of goods because its large labor supply drives down the
relative wage. A rise in trade costs reduces the extensive margin, because it causes low
productivity exporters to quit exporting. On the other hand, the intensive margin of
openness is decreasing in country size but increasing in trade costs. Large labor supply in
the large country yields large output for consumption and thus reduces the expenditure
share of imports. A rise in trade costs increases the intensive margin of openness because
it raises prices for all traded goods.
Second, the beneﬁt from exchange rate ﬂexibility along the extensive margin is in-
creasing in country size, but the beneﬁt along the intensive margin is non-monotonic in
country size. Large country reaps large beneﬁt along the extensive margin, because it
4its large set of goods broadens the scope of reallocation of factors between the traded-
and nontraded-goods sectors. The non-monotonicity of the beneﬁt along the intensive
margin arises from the fact that adjustments along the intensive margin come from both
price and quantity adjustments. Since demand falls when price rises, the eﬀect of price
changes on the consumption expenditure is ambiguous. For this reason, the intensive
margin adjustment drives the non-monotonicity between the beneﬁt and country size. A
small open economy is actually better oﬀ with the ﬂexible exchange rate regime, as in
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002).
Finally, the beneﬁt from exchange rate ﬂexibility along both extensive and intensive
margins is non-monotonic in trade costs. The non-monotonicity of the beneﬁt along the
extensive margin is due to the fact that a change in trade costs changes the range of
export goods in the opposite direction from the range of import goods. Hence, as trade
costs rise, volatility of the exchange rate increases adjustments along the extensive margin
in the export sector, but decreases those in the import sector. The non-monotonicity of
the beneﬁt along the intensive margin comes from the same reason as when we vary
the country size. Given the non-monotonicity of the beneﬁt along the two margins, the
combined beneﬁt is non-monotonic in trade costs.
To summarize, our model predicts that the beneﬁt from ﬂexible exchange rates is
non-monotonic in the degree of openness. The model also predicts that a small open
economy is better oﬀ with the ﬂexible exchange rate system, as in Clarida et al. (2002).
The non-monotonicity is in line with the recent work by Adrian and Gros (2004), who
emphasize the role of external shocks.
The adjustments along extensive margin also partially explain why the correlation
between relative consumption and the RER is low. Backus and Smith (1993) found that
the correlation in the data of OECD countries is 0.05 on average. While the model by
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) generates a correlation of 0.71, our predicted correlation is
only 0.55. This result is driven by the low correlation between the traded and nontraded
5RERs, which results from the oﬀsetting eﬀect of endogenous productivity ﬂuctuations
on the terms of trade. The zero correlation reduces the correlation between the traded
RER and relative consumption of traded goods, and also the correlation between the
nontraded RER and relative consumption of nontraded-goods. Hence, the correlation
between relative consumption and the RER becomes low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the model.
The calibration and results are in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
This section explains the SDGE model of comparative advantage with money also found
in Naknoi (2008). Wages are assumed to be sticky in order to study the role of exchange
rate regimes. This assumption is motivated by the evidence in Liu and Phaneuf (2007),
Kahn (1997), Castellanos et al. (2004) and Huang and Liu (2002). There are two coun-
tries: Home and Foreign. There is a continuum of goods indexed by z ∈ (0,1]. There is a
continuum of competitive ﬁrms producing goods in each industry. Since the key mecha-
nism is related to the exporting decision of ﬁrms, we begin describing the model from the
supply side.
2.1 Firms
A large number of homogeneous ﬁrms take price as given in each industry z . Let Xt
be the total factor productivity, and at(z) be the industry-speciﬁc productivity. The
subscript t denotes the period. Goods prices are fully ﬂexible, hence the invoice currency
is irrelevant. Let the producer price, p
p
t(z), be in the seller’s currency. The representative
ﬁrm in each industry produces the output yt(z) from the labor input lt(z) with the linear
technology,
yt(z) = Xtat(z)lt(z).




Similar equations hold for the foreign ﬁrms.
2.2 Pattern of specialization
Let Φt,a(z) denote the cost of beginning to export. This helps keep the number of new
exporters in line with the estimate in Hummels and Klenow (2005). It is an iceberg cost,
which reduces productivity and raises price such that at(z) = (1 − Φt,a(z))¯ a(z), where
the superscript ”−” denotes the steady state. The cost is time-variant and increasing
in deviations of the long-run relative productivity of the previously least-competitive
industry from that of the current one. Deﬁne the industry-speciﬁc relative productivity
as At(z) = at(z)/a?
t(z), where the superscript ? denotes the foreign variables. Deﬁne
the set of new home export industries as Zn




t denote the endogenously-determined least-competitive industry
in the home and foreign country, respectively. φa is a parameter where φa > 0. The entry














A similar cost function applies to the foreign producers.
International trade is subject to the iceberg trade costs melting a fraction τ of goods.
Deﬁne the relative wage as ωt = Wt/StW ?
t , and the relative TFP as χt = Xt/X?
t . Dorn-
busch et al. (1977) showed that if ∂At/∂z < 0 and 0 < τ < 1, then for any given relative
wage ωt there is a unique solution for zl
t and zh
t such that 0 < zl
t < zh
t < 1 and
At(z
l
t)χt(1 − τ) = ωt = At(z
h
t )χt/(1 − τ). (1)
The specialization pattern is as follows. The home economy produces the goods z ∈ [0,zh
t ]
7and exports the goods z ∈ [0,zl
t]. The foreign economy produces the goods z ∈ [zl
t,1] and
exports the goods z ∈ [zh
t ,1]. Both produce the nontraded goods z ∈ (zl
t,zh
t ) for domestic
consumption.




t = ∅, and Φt,a > 0 for z ∈ Zn




and Φt,a < 0 for z ∈ Zd
t. There are exit beneﬁts from recoverable value in the industrial
organization literature (Ericson and Pakes, 1995). Hence, the entry cost raises the slope
of the relative productivity schedule, and productivity of the exporters relative to non-
exporters at the margin. The cost reduces the range of switching industries by pushing
those about to enter exporting back into the nontraded sector and throwing those about
to quit back into exporting. Since the cost is not a ﬁxed cost but is proportional to
the relative productivity at the margin, the cost does not remove switching even with
small shocks. It creates discontinuity in the relative productivity schedule, but retains
the monotonicity along each segment.
Proposition 1 Suppose dAt(zt)/dzt < 0. Then dzl
t/dωt < 0 and dzh
t /dωt < 0 for all t.




t/dωt) = 1/((1 − τ)¯ χ) > 0. When
dAt(zt)/dzt < 0, dzl
t/dωt < 0. Similarly, dAt(zh
t )/dωt = (dAt(zl
t)/dzh
t )(dzl
t/dωt) = (1 −
τ)/¯ χ > 0. When dAt(zt)/dzt < 0, dzh
t /dωt < 0.
A rise in the relative wage reduces the comparative advantage of the home country and
causes the home exporters at the margin to exit. At the same time the foreign nontraded-
goods producers at the margin begin to export. As a result, the range of export goods
expands but the range of import goods shrinks.
From the home residents’ perspective, we can classify sectors into the import, export
and nontraded sectors, and denote them by i ∈ (F,H,N), respectively. Deﬁne Zt,F =
[zh
t ,1], Zt,H = [0,zl
t], and Zt,N = (zl
t,zh









t(z)(1 − τ)) for z ∈ Zt,F










t(z)) for z ∈ Zt,F ∪ Zt,N
Wt/(StXtat(z) (1 − τ)) for z ∈ Zt,H
If τ = 0, then Zt,N = ∅ and pt(z) = Stpt(z)?. Trade costs create both the nontraded
sector and deviations from the law of one price.
2.3 Price indices
A large number of wholesalers in each sector i ∈ (F,H,N) bundle goods into the constant-












δt,i = sup(Zt,i) − inf(Zt,i). δt,i measures the size of the range of goods in the sector
i. ct(z) is the demand for the good z and θ (θ > 1) is the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution. The CES aggregation is often used in the models of monopolistic competition
with diﬀerentiated products, but the aggregation here takes place across industries. The









A large number of sellers combine the three baskets into ﬁnal consumption in two






















. This assumption is motivated by the
evidence that the elasticity of substitution is greater than one (Hummels, 2001; Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2004). Next, the sellers bundle the traded and nontraded baskets into








T )−1, where sj, j ∈ (N,T), is the
exogenous expenditure share and sN = 1−sT. Fixed shares are assumed, to be consistent
with evidence for stable shares at high frequencies in Stockman and Tesar (1995).
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2.4 Real exchange rate
Deﬁne the real exchange rate (RER) as Qt = StP ?
t /Pt, where St is the nominal exchange
rate. Naknoi (2008) shows that the RER is the product of the traded and nontraded
































The traded RER is the relative price of the traded-goods baskets. The nontraded RER
depends on international diﬀerences in the price of nontraded relative to traded goods.
Deﬁne the sector-level productivity such that the sectoral output is monotonically








,i = H,N. Since only the relative industry productivity matters,
for simplicity assume that a?
t(z) = 1. Deﬁne the terms of trade as Ωt = Pt,H/Pt,F.
Deﬁne the long-run home bias within the traded sector as ¯ h = ¯ sH/¯ sF. Substituting the
equilibrium prices into the terms of trade, (3) and (4), gives the equilibrium path of RERs.
Deﬁne ˆ xt as the short-run deviation from the steady state of the variable x denoted by ¯ x.
Then,




b Qt,N = sN( b At,N − b At,H) − sN







where ξ = ¯ h[(1 − τ)1−θ − (1 − τ)θ−1]/{(1 + ¯ h)[(1 − τ)1−θ + ¯ h(1 − τ)θ−1]} > 0. ξ is the
elasticity of the traded RER appreciation with respect to the terms of trade. Zt is the
range of home exports relative to that of foreign exports, zl
t/(1 − zh
t ).
10Let varT, varN and corrTN denote the variance of the traded and nontraded RERs,






(1 − ξ)var(b Ωt) −
ξ
(θ − 1)2var(b Zt) −
1 − 2ξ
θ − 1
cov(b Ωt, b Zt)
−cov( b At,N − b At,H, b Ωt) +
1
θ − 1
cov( b At,N − b At,H, b Zt)

. (7)
Proposition 2 If ˆ zl
t = ˆ zh
t = 0, then |corrTN| = 1.
Proof. If ˆ zl
t = ˆ zh
t = 0, then ˆ Zt = ˆ At,i = 0. Hence, (5), (6) and (7) give corrTN = 1 if
ξ < 1 and corrTN = −1 if ξ > 1.
Without the extensive margin adjustment, the traded and nontraded RERs are per-
fectly correlated. The perfect correlation is caused by the terms of trade, or the relative
wage in this case. This result was also shown in Naknoi (2008). We display it here because
it is central to the mechanism in this study.
This result has important implications for open-economy macroeconomics. The exten-
sive margin adjustment is the mechanism that generates the weak or absence of correlation
of the traded and nontraded RERs in Naknoi (2008) to match the statistics reported in
Engel (1999), Mendoza (2000) and Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005). The weak
correlation implies that the adjustment along the extensive margin reduces volatility of the
RER, and hence the cost of business cycle ﬂuctuations. These ﬂuctuations are removed
by adjustment of relative prices including the RERs or the intensive margin adjustment in
the standard literature. In Proposition 1, the extensive margin adjustment is produced by
volatility of the relative wage, which in turn depends on the exchange rate. We introduces
sticky wages in the next section to model nominal exchange rates.
2.5 Households and sticky wages
The model features a monopolistically competitive labor market, in which the wage-setting
households are indexed by k ∈ (0,1]. The set of home residents is [0,α],α ∈ (0,1). The set
of foreign residents is (α,1]. The home residents’ optimization problem is described, and
11the foreign one is a mirror image. The household k’s utility depends on its consumption
Ck
t , its real money balance Mk
t /Pt, and its labor supply lk
t, which depends on its wage
W k


































0 < β < 1, µ < 1, σ > 0,  > 0. κm > 0, and κl > 0. The household accumulates
assets through money and a one-period home-currency international bond F k
t paying the
interest rate it. Adjusting the bond holdings is assumed to be costly, to prevent the bond
holding from becoming inﬁnitely large. Otherwise, the model cannot be solved by the log-
linearization technique (Turnovsky, 1985). The cost is quadratic in deviations of the real
value of bond holdings from its steady-state, assumed to be zero, Φ(F k




It is also costly to adjust wages, and the cost is similar to the price adjustment cost
in Rotemberg (1982). The cost is quadratic in deviations of the wage inﬂation from its
steady state, h(π
w,k









t = W k
t /W k
t−1 and φw > 0. T k
t is the
government transfer. ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence. The budget constraint requires that the
































































>0, taking as given the price sequence
{Pt}∞
t=0 and the initial conditions (W k
−1,F k
−1,Mk
−1). All households face an identical prob-




























λw = (η − 1)¯ w¯ l/(βφw¯ π2) > 0 and λl = µ − 1 > 0. wt is the real wage Wt/Pt. Because
of wage rigidity, the wage inﬂation rises when the marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
between consumption and labor exceeds the real wage during a consumption boom. The
Euler equation and the real money demand functions are typical ones in the literature.
Assume a foreign-currency bond so that the foreign interest rate i?
t is well-deﬁned.
The bond is available only to the foreign residents and has zero supply in equilibrium.
The Euler conditions yield the interest rate parity condition:
ˆ St = Et ˆ St+1 −
¯ ı
1 +¯ ı





2.6 Degree of trade openness
The typical measure of openness is the trade-to-GDP ratio, denoted by ψt. It can be
calculated from the optimal consumption and the budget constraint. Let bt denote the
current account relative to GDP. Then,











With zero bond holdings in the long run, ¯ b = ¯ b? = 0 and the import share is the same as
the export share. Hence, ¯ ψ = 2¯ sF. Since the expenditure share of imports and exports
depend also on the extensive margin, we can decompose trade openness into the extensive
and intensive margins as follows:
¯ ψ = (2¯ z
l)(¯ sF/¯ z
l). (10)
132.7 Exchange rate regimes
Exchange rate variability is formulated as an outcome of the exchange rate policy char-
acterized by the home interest rate rule. Under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the home
central bank adopts the following rule.
ˆ ıt = ˆ ı
?
t + ˆ St + λff
?
t ,




t ). This rule and the interest parity condition in (8) give ˆ St = 0 or ﬁxed exchange
rates. The rule is similar to that in Benigno (2004) and Monacelli (2004). Deﬁne the real




z∈Zt,H∪Zt,N pt(z)yt(z)dz, and the inﬂation rate
as πt. The rule in Chari et al. (2002) is adopted under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime:
ˆ ıt = λiˆ ıt−1 + (1 − λi)
h
λπEtˆ πt+1 + λy ˆ Yt
i
The foreign central bank always follows a similar rule:
ˆ ı
∗
t = λiˆ ı
∗








To focus on the exchange rate policy, the seigniorage revenue is assumed to be rebated to
the households, Tt = (Mt − Mt−1)P
−1
t .
2.8 Stochastic process of shocks
The focus here is on productivity shocks because the literature emphasizes the beneﬁt from
exchange rate ﬂexibility in the presence of real shocks. The TFP shocks are characterized
by the following stationary ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.
ln(Xt) = ρxln(Xt) + ut
ln(X
?




t ) + u
?
t
140 < ρx < 1 and 0 < ρ?
x < 1. ut and u?




2.9 Measure of welfare
The welfare loss from ﬁxing the exchange rate is measured by the permanent decrease in
consumption that the household is willing to give up to achieve the same expected utility
as the ﬂoating regime. The measure is similar to that in Sutherland (2006), Devereux
and Engel (2003) and Kollmann (2004). Denote the welfare loss as Γ, the expected utility
under the ﬂexible regime as V flex, and the expected utility under the ﬁxed regime as V fix.




































Diﬀerencing the two values of the expected utility and rearranging terms give the solution
for Γ:
Γ = 1 −
 
1 +








The quantitative predictions of the model are in the next section.
3 Calibration
Table 1 tabulates the benchmark parameters. The parameters related to specialization
are selected so that the elasticity of the relative set of exports with respect to relative
country size does not exceed the estimate in Hummels and Klenow (2005). The trade cost
parameter is from Hummels (2001). Most parameters follow the standard business cycle
literature such as Mendoza (1991) and Chari et al. (2002). The interest rate rule under
15the ﬂexible exchange rate regime is the estimated rule from the U.S. data by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000). With symmetric country size, the degree of trade openness is 0.21.
This is slightly higher than openness of the U.S. but comparable to that of the U.K.
3.1 Benchmark calibration results
Table 2 summarizes the results from 50 simulations. Reported statistics are the average
of all simulations, except for the welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rates. Column 1
corresponds to the model in this study. However, to understand the eﬀect of extensive
margin adjustment we need to compare the statistics with comparable ones obtained from
the model with only adjustments along the intensive margin. For this reason, Column
2 reports the corresponding statistics from an alternative model in which the pattern of
specialization is given by the steady state of the benchmark model. The last column
presents the diﬀerence in statistics from the model with endogenous specialization and
the model with exogenous specialization. In other words, the last column reports the
eﬀects of extensive margin adjustments.
There are ﬁve main ﬁndings. First, with endogenous specialization the welfare loss
is positive for both countries. Hence, the ﬂexible exchange rate regime dominates the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Given that the monetary rule for the ﬂexible exchange rate
regime is not an optimized rule which can yield higher welfare, this result implies that
the ﬂexible exchange rate regime is desirable. This prediction is in line with Devereux
and Engel (2003), given the absence of local currency pricing.
Second, the extensive margin adjustment increases the welfare loss by roughly 1 per-
cent in the home country and half a percent in the foreign country. The magnitude is
large compared to the welfare loss generated by the intensive margin in Column 2.
Third, the extensive margin reduces volatility of the RER and the terms of trade,
but raises volatility of the current account-to-GDP ratio and the trade-balance-to-GDP
ratio. The reason is that positive TFP shocks drive up the relative wage and cause low-
productivity exporters to quit exporting. The exit of low-productivity ﬁrms increases the
16average productivity in the export sector, which oﬀsets the impact of rising relative wage
on the terms of trade. The fall of the terms of trade volatility then reduces volatility of
the RER. The resulting decrease of volatility of the quantity margin of trade is intuitive
since now there is an additional adjustment margin.
Fourth, the oﬀsetting eﬀect of average productivity ﬂuctuations on terms of trade is
so large that the correlation between the traded and nontraded RERs is virtually zero.
This result conﬁrms the prediction in Proposition 2. Moreover, Engel (1999) found that
the correlation in the U.S. RER data is zero. This result has been documented by Naknoi
(2008), and we report it here as a consistency check.
Finally, adjustments along the extensive margin reduce the correlation between relative
consumption of the two economies and the RER, from roughly 0.8 to 0.55. Although our
correlation is much higher than that in Backus and Smith (1993), it is lower than 0.71 in
Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
To summarize, the quantitative results suggest that adjustments along the extensive
margin signiﬁcantly increase the dynamic adjustments through trade and current account.
Hence, adjustments along the extensive margin reduce variability of the RER and increase
the beneﬁt from exchange rate ﬂexibility.
Next, we vary the parameters for country size and trade costs to study the impact of
trade openness on the beneﬁt from exchange rate ﬂexibility.
3.2 Eﬀects of country size
Figure 1 plots the degree of trade openness against the size of the home country. The
degree of openness is decreasing in country size. When we decompose openness according
to (10), the extensive margin of openness is increasing in country size, but the intensive
margin of openness is decreasing in country size. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
ﬁnding in Hummels and Klenow (2005). In our model, the large country exports a wide
range of goods because its large labor supply drives down the relative wage. Large labor
supply also yields large output for consumption and thus reduces the expenditure share
17of imports.
Figure 2 plots the welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rate against the size of the home
country. The welfare loss is non-monotonic in country size. However, the loss along the
extensive margin is increasing in country size, but the loss along the intensive margin is
non-monotonic in country size. The non-monotonicity arises from the fact that adjust-
ments along the intensive margin come from both price and quantity adjustments. Since
demand falls when price rises, the eﬀect of price changes on the value of consumption is
ambiguous. Consequently, the intensive margin drives the non-monotonicity between the
welfare loss and degree of trade openness.
3.3 Eﬀects of trade costs
Figure 3 plots the degree of trade openness against trade costs. The degree of openness is
decreasing in trade costs, and so is the extensive margin of openness. This is because high
trade costs expands the range of nontraded goods. However, rising trade costs increase
the intensive margin of openness. When trade costs rise, prices of traded goods rise as a
result. Hence, our results imply that the reduction of demand is small, and therefore the
expenditure on each traded good is increasing in trade costs.
Figure 4 plots the welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rate against trade costs. The
welfare loss is non-monotonic in trade costs. The non-monotonicity exists when we de-
compose the loss into the extensive and intensive margins too. The non-monotonicity
of the intensive margin arises from the same mechanism as when we vary the country
size. However, the non-monotonicity of the welfare loss along the extensive margin is
particularly interesting.
When trade costs rise, the set of home exports and the set of home imports contract
at the same time, since trade costs determine not only the relative wage but also the
relative productivity schedule faced by the two countries. As a result, the number of
ﬁrms switching in and out of exporting will be small unless exchange rate ﬂuctuations are
large.
18In contrast, a rise in country size inﬂuences only the real wage, keeping the relative
productivity schedule unchanged. Hence, it has the opposite eﬀect on the set of home
exports and the set of home imports. In fact, the width of the range of nontraded goods
is not inﬂuenced by country size, although a change in country size shifts the range of
nontraded goods. For this reason, an increase in country size does not diminish the
extensive margin adjustment.
4 Concluding remarks
This study investigates the eﬀects of trade openness on the beneﬁt from exchange rate
ﬂexibility. We ﬁnd no evidence that ﬁxing exchange rates is desirable. Although the
monetary rule under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime in this study is not an optimized
rule, it is suﬃcient to say that ﬂexible exchange rate policy dominates ﬁxed exchange rate
policy. This is because by construction an optimal policy will increase the welfare under
the ﬂexible regime, and therefore it will make the ﬂexible regime even more desirable.
Our work lends support to the argument that a small open economy does not need
to include the exchange rate in the monetary rule in Clarida et al. (2002). It produces
the same prediction as Adrian and Gros (2004), although their arguments are based on
a diﬀerent mechanism. In Adrian and Gros (2004), a high degree of trade openness can
increase the cost of ﬁxing exchange rates when foreign shocks are large. However, our
result holds despite the symmetry of size of shocks in the two countries.
When we decompose the beneﬁt of exchange rate ﬂexibility into the extensive and
intensive margins. We ﬁnd that openness has diﬀerent impacts on the beneﬁt along the
extensive and intensive margins. To be speciﬁc, the beneﬁt is increasing in the degree
of openness only when it is measured as the beneﬁt along the extensive margin and
variations in trade openness is driven by variations in country size. As demonstrated by
the quantitative exercise, the beneﬁt along the extensive margin is no more monotonic
in the degree of openness when variations in trade openness are driven by trade costs.
19However, the beneﬁt along the intensive margin is always non-monotonic in the degree of
trade openness. For this reason, the combined beneﬁt along the two adjustment margins
is non-monotonic in the degree of trade openness.
Apart from the welfare comparison, our model can also generate two important busi-
ness cycle properties of the RER. The model yields zero correlation between the traded
and nontraded RERs as documented by Engel (1999). It also reduces the correlation
between the RER and relative consumption. The predicted correlation is closer to the
estimated zero correlation in Backus and Smith (1993) than the study by Ghironi and
Melitz (2005). Hence, our model has the potential to explain the lack of correlation
between the RER and relative consumption. Taking into account the ﬁrm’s investment
decisions is a natural extension of this study.
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Parameters Value
Specialization
(Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hummels, 2001)
Country size α = 0.5
Relative productivity n = 1.5,γ = 1
Entry-cost parameter φa = 9
Trade costs τ = 0.15
Households
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution θ = 3
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004)
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ = 0.2
(Chari et al., 2002)
Expenditure share of nontraded goods sN = 0.5
(Falvey and Gemmell, 1995)
Discount factor β = 0.99
(Chari et al., 2002)
Elasticity of labor supply µ = 1 − 1/σ
(Chari et al., 2002)
Interest semi-elasticity of money demand 1/ = 0.39
(Chari et al., 2002)
Portfolio adjustment cost φ = 0.00074
(Mendoza, 1991)
Labor market
(Huang and Liu, 2002)
Elasticity of substitution of labor η = 4
Wage adjustment cost φw = 5.8935
Monetary policy
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000)
Steady-state inﬂation ¯ π = ¯ π? = 1.03580.25
Interest rate rule λi = 0.79, λπ = 2.15, λy = 0.93
Productivity shock
(Chari et al., 2002)
Persistence ρx = 0.95
Volatility σu = σ?
u = 0.01, σu,u? = (0.25)0.012Table 2: Benchmark calibration results
Endogenous Exogenous Extensive
specialization specialization margin eﬀect
Welfare loss
Home country 0.013 0.004 0.009
Foreign country 0.005 -0.0004 0.006
Standard deviation
Real exchange rate
Fixed regime 2.03 4.03 -1.99
Flexible regime 2.29 4.30 -2.01
Terms of trade
Fixed regime 2.23 4.34 -2.11
Flexible regime 2.51 4.66 -2.15
Current account/GDP
Fixed regime 5.08 4.10 0.98
Flexible regime 5.92 5.10 0.81
Trade balance/GDP
Fixed regime 2.16 1.94 0.22




Fixed regime 0.05 1 -0.95
Flexible regime 0.07 1 -0.93
Data (Engel, 1999) 0 0
Relative consumption
and real exchange rate
Fixed regime 0.55 0.81 -0.26
Flexible regime 0.54 0.80 -0.26
Data (Backus and Smith, 1993) 0.05 0.05
Notes:
1. Welfare loss is measured by percentage decrease of ﬂexible-regime consumption that
yields the same expected lifetime utility as the allocation of consumption, real money
balance and labor under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
2. Except for the welfare loss, reported statistics are the average over 50 simulations.
3. Standard deviations are measured relative to the standard deviation of output.Figure 1: Country size and degree of trade openness
Note: Trade openness = (value of exports + value of imports)/GDPFigure 2: Country size and welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rates
Notes:
1. Welfare loss is measured by percentage decrease of ﬂexible-regime consumption that
yields the same expected lifetime utility as the allocation of consumption, real money
balance and labor under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
2. Total welfare loss = welfare loss along the extensive margin + welfare loss along the
intensive margin.Figure 3: Trade costs and degree of trade openness
Note: Trade openness = (value of exports + value of imports)/GDPFigure 4: Trade costs and welfare loss from ﬁxing exchange rates
Notes:
1. Welfare loss is measured by percentage decrease of ﬂexible-regime consumption that
yields the same expected lifetime utility as the allocation of consumption, real money
balance and labor under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
2. Total welfare loss = welfare loss along the extensive margin + welfare loss along the
intensive margin.